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Our federal courts have introduced a degree of uncertainty in the law of pleading that ought to be resolved
with a clear decision about the scope of Twombly and Iqbal. We write to set forth what we believe are the
overwhelming arguments in support of the developing majority view: pleading standards should not
distinguish between plaintiffs and defendants, or between pleadings asserting and pleadings defending against
a claim. Proponents of the minority view make policy arguments grounded in the asserted realities of
litigation, leveraging small textual differences between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 8(a) and 8(c). But
the sounder position adopts an even-handed symmetry in pleading. Since there is a paucity of literature on
this subject, we write to urge courts to adopt the current majority position and eliminate this uncertainty.
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P L E A D I N G S
Plausible Answers and Affirmative Defenses
BY TOM TINKHAM AND ERIC JANUS
I n its 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
1
and with emphasis in 2009 in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,2 the
United States Supreme Court clarified and, accord-
ing to many commentators, heightened the pleading re-
quirements for complaints. Apparently abandoning the
common understanding of ‘‘notice pleading’’ set out in
the much-cited decision Conley v. Gibson,3 Twombly
and Iqbal explain that Rule 8(a) requires that a com-
plaint, in addition to stating a viable legal theory, must
provide sufficient facts to make recovery on the legal
theory ‘‘plausible.’’4 In the four years since Twombly,
numerous federal district courts have considered the
question of whether this new requirement of plausibil-
ity should apply to affirmative defenses.5 While a ma-
jority of those courts has extended the plausibility re-
quirement to affirmative defenses, no federal circuit
court has yet ruled on the issue, and a minority of dis-
trict courts has concluded that the requirement should
not apply to affirmative defenses.6 This conflict among
1 550 U.S. 544, 75 U.S.L.W. 4337 (2007).
2 ___ U.S. ___, 77 U.S.L.W. 4387, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
3 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 4 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 1974; Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
5 See, e.g., Francisco v. Verizon South Inc., No. 3:09cv737,
2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 77083 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2010); Wells
Fargo & Co. v. United States, No. 09-CV-2764, 2010 WL
4530158 (D. Minn. October 27, 2010).
6 See Francisco, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 77083, at *16-17
(‘‘Among those district courts to have considered the issue, a
split of authority exists. The majority of district courts have ex-
tended the Twombly-Iqbal standard to a defendant’s pleading
of affirmative defenses.’’). See also Manual John Dominguez,
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our federal courts has introduced a degree of uncer-
tainty in the law of pleading that ought to be resolved
with a clear decision about the scope of Twombly and
Iqbal.
We write to set forth what we believe are the over-
whelming arguments in support of the developing ma-
jority view: pleading standards should not distinguish
between plaintiffs and defendants,7 or between plead-
ings asserting and pleadings defending against a claim.
Proponents of the minority view make policy argu-
ments grounded in the asserted realities of litigation, le-
veraging small textual differences between Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 8(a) and 8(c).8 But the
sounder position adopts an even-handed symmetry in
pleading. Since there is a paucity of literature on this
subject, we write to urge courts to adopt the current ma-
jority position and eliminate this uncertainty.9
We begin by examining the rationale and context of
the two Supreme Court cases. In Twombly, the Court
focused on the language of Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 8(a)(2) requiring ‘‘a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to re-
lief.’’10 The Court then quoted Conley for the proposi-
tion that the purpose of the rule is to ‘‘give the defen-
dant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.’’11 Expanding on its rationale, the
Court cited Dura Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Broudo12 and
said that a plausibility requirement ‘‘serves the practical
purpose of preventing a plaintiff with ‘a largely ground-
less claim’ from ‘tak[ing] up the time of a number of
other people, with the right to do so representing an in
terrorem increase of the settlement value.’ ’’13
Twombly involved a Sherman Act claim of con-
spiracy grounded in the alleged prevention of competi-
tive entry into the local telephone markets.14 In support
of the allegation of conspiracy, the plaintiff alleged an
agreement to restrict competition, supporting that char-
acterization by the factual allegation that the defen-
dants engaged in parallel conduct.15 The Court held
that parallel conduct alone was insufficient to support a
plausible inference of an illegal agreement since paral-
lel conduct was as consistent with ordinary competitive
conduct as with conspiracy.16 The plaintiff was obli-
gated to plead additional factual support even though
the facts related to any conspiracy would have been pri-
marily or exclusively in the control of defendants. The
Court rejected the notion of allowing limited discovery
before dismissing the action, explaining: ‘‘It is no an-
swer to say that a claim just shy of plausible entitlement
can be weeded out early in the discovery process, given
the common lament that the success of judicial supervi-
sion in checking discovery abuse has been modest.’’17
In the second case, Iqbal, the Court made clear that
the plausibility standard applies to pleading all types of
claims, not just antitrust claims.18 The Court cited
Twombly for the propositions that ‘‘naked assertion[s]’’
or a ‘‘formulaic recitation of the element of a cause of
action will not do.’’19 ‘‘Threadbare recitals of the ele-
ments of a cause of action supported by mere conclu-
sory statements do not suffice’’ and they do ‘‘not unlock
the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with noth-
ing more than conclusions.’’20
Iqbal involved a claim that the attorney general and
other high-ranking officials had discriminated against
Muslims in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.21 Under the
Bivens standard, the plaintiff was required to show that
the defendants adopted the policies not for normal in-
vestigative reasons but for the purpose of discrimina-
tion.22 In spite of the fact that the information regard-
ing defendants’ state of mind was largely or totally
within the defendants’ control, the Court ordered the
complaint dismissed, stating: ‘‘Yet respondent’s com-
plaint does not contain any factual allegations sufficient
to plausibly suggest petitioners’ discriminatory state of
mind. . . .’’23
I. Two Primary Principles
We begin our discussion with two preliminary obser-
vations. First, absent some clear textual or policy rea-
son, the Federal Rules should not be understood to cre-
ate systemically different treatment for plaintiffs and
defendants. Burdens imposed by the rules of pleading,
like all procedural standards, matter. Pleading rules
stand at the gates of the powerful, and expensive,
disclosure-discovery regime of modern American litiga-
tion. Creating party-based differentials in access to the
tools of discovery introduces a systemic bias into litiga-
tion that cannot be ascribed to the drafters of the Fed-
eral Rules. At key junctures, the Supreme Court has re-
jected party-based rule distinctions. For example, Hick-
man v. Taylor24 the Court rejected arguments that an
asymmetrical interpretation of the discovery rules was
necessary in order to protect ‘‘individual plaintiffs’’
from ‘‘corporate defendants,’’ holding clearly that dis-
covery ‘‘is not a one-way proposition.’’25 Similarly, in
Schlagenhauf v. Holder,26 the Court refused to read the
et al., The Plausibility Standard as a Double Edged Sword: The
Application of Twombly and Iqbal to Affirmative Defenses, 84
FLA. B. J. 77 (2010); Ryan Mize, From Plausibility to Clarity: An
Analysis of the Implication of Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Possible
Remedies, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1245, 1260-1261 (2010).
7 Francisco, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 77083 at *24; Barnes v.
AT&T Pension Benefit Plan–Nonbargained Program, 718
F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1172 (N.D. Ca. 2010); Palmer v. Oakland
Farms Inc., No. 5:10cv00029, slip op. at 15-16 (W.D. Va. June
24, 2010); Hayne v. Green Ford Sales Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 650
(D. Kan. 2009). Cf. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (in-
dicating that discovery rules should generally be applied to
both plaintiffs and defendants); Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379
U.S. 104, 114 (1964) (holding that Rule 35 should apply to all
parties including the defendant).
8 See, e.g., Dominguez et al., supra note 6 at 79 (discussing
such textual analyses made by courts).
9 See Dominguez et al., supra note 6, at 78; Mize, supra
note 3, at 1251.
10 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554-556.
11 Id. at 556.
12 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005).
13 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 546.
14 Id. at 550-551.
15 Id. at 551.
16 Id. at 564-569.
17 Id. at 559.
18 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
19 Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 1942.
22 Id. at 1948-49.
23 Id. at 1952.
24 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
25 Id. at 506.
26 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
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Federal Rules in a party-specific context, opining that
‘‘[i]ssues cannot be resolved by favoring one class of
litigants over another.’’27 In fact, imposing asymmetri-
cal pleading standards by party-status might come close
to violating the Rules Enabling Act, under which ‘‘sub-
stantive’’ rules of law are off limits in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.28 While pleading rules are clearly
procedural, biases in pleading rules impose litigation
burdens akin to burdens of proof, an area carefully
avoided by the Federal Rules29 and arguably falling on
the substantive, and therefore forbidden, side of the led-
ger.30
The second preliminary observation concerns the
wisdom, or lack thereof, of the Court’s decisions in
Iqbal and Twombly. There is a large body of literature
skewering the Court’s reasoning in the two cases. The
burden of the critique is that the Court’s claim that it is
not imposing a heightened pleading standard is disin-
genuous, that the standard of ‘‘plausibility’’ imports a
dangerous level of subjectivity into the gatekeeping
function of Rule 12, that it rests on unwarranted as-
sumptions, and that the likely victims of the heightened
standard and its subjectivity will be plaintiffs asserting
civil rights and other outsider claims.31
Our purpose in this paper does not include an evalu-
ation of the Court’s reasoning or the wisdom of the
plausibility standard. Rather, accepting the reality of
the standard for plaintiffs, we argue that it should be
applied equally to defendants. We argue that differen-
tial standards can be justified only on clear textual or
policy grounds. Both are lacking here.
II. Applying the Language of the Rules
To the Issue
The starting point for any analysis ought to be the
text of the rules. To be sure, the language of Rule 8(a),
governing claims-pleading, differs slightly from the
texts of Rule 8(b) and (c) that set the standards for
pleading defenses. But the two standards share key lan-
guage. Viewed in the context of the principle of party-
neutrality, the best reading of the pleading rules is that
they apply pleading standards uniformly to plaintiffs
and defendants.
Rule 8(a) applies to claims and requires ‘‘a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.’’32 Rule 8(b) requires that the defen-
dant ‘‘state in short and plain terms its defenses to each
claim asserted against it.’’33 Rule 8(c) requires a party
responding to a pleading to ‘‘affirmatively state any
avoidance or affirmative defenses’’ and then lists 19 af-
firmative defenses.34
Thus, both claims and defenses must be asserted in
‘‘short and plain’’ statements. The ‘‘short and plain’’
statement must ‘‘show’’ that the claim-pleader is ‘‘en-
titled to relief.’’ But the ‘‘show’’ language is missing
from the defense-oriented rules. Is this omission
significant?
The Supreme Court focused on the ‘‘show’’ require-
ment to provide textual support for the plausibility stan-
dard.35 After all, how does a pleader ‘‘show’’ entitle-
ment to relief without linking a legal theory to facts?
Without some factual allegation, a pleading is a bare
claim. It may assert entitlement to relief, but does not
show it.
What are we to make of the asymmetry between the
language of Rule 8(a) and Rule 8(b)? Both provisions
require statements that are ‘‘short and plain.’’ The
‘‘show’’ language of Rule 8(a) helps explain how ‘‘short
and plain’’ a statement of a claim may be, while the lan-
guage of Rule 8(b) leaves that question unanswered.
One way to understand this pattern is that the drafters
intended to apply the same standard to both claims and
defenses—the ‘‘short and plain’’ standard—and for that
reason the extra gloss on the meaning of the standard
in Rule 8(a) should help explain the language in Rule
8(b). The other interpretation is that the drafters in-
tended that the words ‘‘short and plain’’ in Rule 8(a)
have a meaning different from the same words in Rule
8(b), leaving the pleader and the courts to guess as to
how ‘‘short and plain’’ a statement of an affirmative de-
fense may be.
The general principle of party-neutrality suggests
strongly that ‘‘short and plain’’ has the same meaning
for defendants as it has for plaintiffs. Two other struc-
tural aspects of the Rules point in the same direction.
First, Rule 11 applies identically to claims and de-
fenses.36 Both must be ‘‘warranted by . . . law,’’37 and
‘‘factual contentions’’ must have, or be likely to have,
‘‘evidentiary support.’’38 Pleaders must certify to both
after conducting an ‘‘inquiry reasonable under the cir-
cumstances.’’39 The ‘‘warranted by law’’ requirement
clearly requires factual as well as legal viability, and ap-
plies to both claims and affirmative defenses. Thus, un-
der Rule 11, plaintiffs and defendants alike must check,
and certify, the factual grounds for their claims.
The second structural indicator that claims and affir-
mative defenses are to be treated alike is found in the
Rule 12(b)(6) -12(c) -12(f) sequence. All three provide a
means to check the sufficiency of pleadings by motion
early in the litigation. With respect to ‘‘claims,’’ a mo-
tion under Rule 12(b)(6) must show a ‘‘failure to state a
claim.’’ This language clearly invokes the pleading stan-
dard of Rule 8(a), putting at issue whether the com-
plaint contains a ‘‘short and plain’’ statement of the
claim ‘‘showing’’ that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rules 12(c) and (f) allow a check on ‘‘insufficient’’ de-
fenses. This language clearly asks as to the legal suffi-
ciency of the defense—i.e., whether if proved it would
27 Id. at 113.
28 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)
29 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a), 56(a)(6).
30 Cf. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
31 E,g., Ramzi Kassem, Iqbal and Race: Implausible Reali-
ties: Iqbal’s Entrenchment of Majority Group Skepticism To-
wards Discrimination Claims, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1443
(2010); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A
Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE
L. J. 1 (2010).
32 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
33 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1)(A).
34 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c).
35 See Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007).
36 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). The provisions of Rule 11(b)(3), ap-
plying to factual assertions, and Rule 11(b)(4), applying to de-
nials, are relatively parallel given the nature of the differences
between the two sides. Id. Under Rule 11(b)(3), factual conten-
tions, at a minimum, ‘‘will likely have evidentiary support after
a reasonable opportunity for further investigation’’ while Rule
11(b)(4) allows denials where ‘‘reasonably based on belief or
lack of information.’’ Id.
37 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2)
38 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3).
39 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
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defeat the claim. It also provides the setting for a court
to determine whether the defense is supported by ad-
equate factual contentions or denials. By providing par-
allel tools for checking the sufficiency of claims and de-
fenses, the rules emphasize the principle of party-
neutrality. Yet the equal efficacy of these sufficiency-
checkpoints depends on uniform application of the
plausibility rule.
III. Response to Reasons Offered
For Differential Treatment
We turn now to the major policy reason asserted to
support differential treatment of plaintiffs’ and defen-
dants’ pleadings: the notion that the short time for an-
swering significantly truncates defendants’ access to
the facts necessary to satisfy the plausibility require-
ment for affirmative defenses.
Defendants do not generally have less access to
plausibility-facts than do plaintiffs. A review of the af-
firmative defenses listed in Rule 8(c) suggests that a de-
fendant will generally have knowledge equal to or
greater than the plaintiff regarding relevant facts.40 For
example, for accord and satisfaction the defendant
must have been involved in the accord and will there-
fore have access to the facts. Similarly, the defense of
estoppel requires that the defendant relied on some
statement or action of the plaintiff. The defendant must
know those facts and therefore be able to plead them.
The same could be said for defenses based on arbitra-
tion and award, duress, license, payment, release, res
judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, and
waiver. True, with respect to affirmative defenses like
contributory negligence, fraud, injury by fellow servant,
and assumption of risk some key information might be
in the hands of the plaintiff. But plaintiffs are often put
at the same disadvantage by the plausibility require-
ment. In the two key cases, Twombly and Iqbal, it was
the defendants who had by far the most access to perti-
nent facts, yet the Court imposed the requirement of
pleading plausible factual support on the plaintiff.
When either party confronts a recalcitrant opponent
who controls liability-critical facts, the inaccessibility to
discovery may be decisive no matter how long the party
has to prepare. In general, access to critical information
is not a persuasive distinction between plaintiffs and
defendants.
But the proponents of pleading-asymmetry take the
argument a step further, pointing out that the 21-day
period allowed for answering is much shorter than the
years-long periods often allowed by statutes of limita-
tion. A minority of courts have argued that plaintiffs of-
ten have years to conduct an investigation while a de-
fendant has only twenty-one days, justifying a different
pleading standard for defendants.41 As one court ex-
plained:42
[P]laintiffs and defendants are in much different posi-
tions. Typically, a plaintiff has months—often years—to
investigate a claim before pleading that claim in federal
court. By contrast, a defendant typically has 21 days to
serve an answer. Whatever one thinks of Iqbal and
Twombly, the ‘plausibility’ requirement that they impose
is more fairly imposed on plaintiffs who have years to in-
vestigate than on defendants who have 21 days.
Thus, the argument goes, plaintiffs will have years to
marshal their evidence, while defendants will have
weeks.
But the reality is more complex. It will be a rare mat-
ter where a defendant first learns of potential litigation
from the service of the summons. More likely, both par-
ties will understand simultaneously that a litigation-
potential event has occurred, and prudent parties, no
matter what their posture regarding the event, will take
steps to preserve and collect the evidence. Why should
a careless defendant be coddled while a careless plain-
tiff pays with dismissal?
Of course, most defendants can obtain at least one
extension and the Rule 15 liberal amendment standard
will apply for some portion of the discovery period.43
More significantly, the party with the factual advantage
is not necessarily the party with the most time for infor-
mal discovery, but rather the party with the most infor-
mal access to the facts. Time, without formal discovery
tools, would not have aided the plaintiffs in Twombly to
find the hidden facts of a conspiracy or in Iqbal to dis-
cover the mental state of John Ashcroft. If the facts of
Twombly and Iqbal are representative, in most situa-
tions a defendant has equal or greater access to
litigation-critical facts. Factual-access disparity pro-
vides no basis for applying a lesser pleading standard to
defendants.
As we have pointed out, the key collateral damage of
the plausibility standard is denial of access to discovery.
In this context, interestingly enough, the rules operate
somewhat asymmetrically. But the asymmetry favors
defendants, and ameliorates for defendants the harsh-
ness of the plausibility hurdle. Here is the asymmetry:
If a plaintiff fails the plausibility test, his or her com-
plaint is dismissed. Even where re-pleading is allowed,
there is no opportunity for discovery unless adequate
facts are first pleaded. The lawsuit ends and no discov-
ery ever occurs. In contrast, if a defendant does not
plead adequate facts for an affirmative defense, the suit
(and discovery) does proceed. There is some chance
that discovery will disclose necessary facts and the
court might allow the defendant to amend, asserting the
now-factually supported defense.
True, the scope of discovery is limited to matters ‘‘rel-
evant to any party’s claim or defense.’’44 In a litigation
environment hostile to broad discovery, facts related to
an unpleaded affirmative defense might fall outside of
this standard.45 Further, even if discovery yields the key
defense-supporting facts, courts normally set amend-
ment deadlines in Rule 16 orders long before the close
of discovery, thus defendants must often face a more
stringent ‘‘good cause’’ standard for amendment in-
stead of the more liberal amendment provisions of Rule
15.46 And even if the amendment is sought before the
Rule 16 deadline, defendants must face potential
amendment-defeating claims of delay-based prejudice.
But at worst, these risks put the fact-deficient defendant
in the same position as the fact-deficient plaintiff.
The rationale for applying the plausibility require-
ment to plaintiffs applies as well to defendants. The Su-
40 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c).
41 Wells Fargo & Co., 2010 WL 4530158, at *2.
42 Id.
43 FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2).
44 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
45 See Id.
46 FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2), 15(b)(1), 16(b)(4).
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preme Court’s rationale for this rule goes beyond sim-
ply providing notice of a claim or defense.47 If notice
alone were sufficient for a claim, a plaintiff’s recitation
of the legal theory would be sufficient. Likewise, if mere
notice were the goal, simply alleging ‘‘accord and satis-
faction’’ would be sufficient. The plausibility require-
ment is grounded on the principle that courts should be
able to dispose of matters, prior to discovery, where
otherwise legally-valid claims or defenses lack suffi-
cient factual support.48 Requiring the pleading of facts
allows courts to check not only for legal viability, but
for a level of factual viability as well. Groundless de-
fenses, particularly groundless affirmative defenses, of-
ten needlessly occupy the parties and the courts.49
There is a very common practice of simply listing nu-
merous affirmative defenses in an answer without pro-
viding any basis for them.50 A diligent plaintiff must
then use the limited number of interrogatories available
to inquire about the factual basis for each defense. It is
not uncommon to see discovery disputes about these in-
terrogatories, and motions for partial summary judg-
ment may be brought where discovery discloses that
defendants lack adequate factual bases for pleaded de-
fenses. Requiring a ‘‘plausible’’ factual basis for affir-
mative defenses would move the test for unsupported
defenses to the pre-discovery stage, rendering these ex-
pensive and time-consuming skirmishes unnecessary.
Finally, the argument is made that imposing a factual
requirement for affirmative defenses would ‘‘radically
change’’ civil practice.51 Under pre-Iqbal practice, the
argument goes, a defendant could just list affirmative
defenses and if the defenses ultimately have no factual
basis, the parties would just ignore them.52 Imposing a
plausibility standard, the argument proceeds, would ne-
cessitate more motions to amend which would be con-
tested and burden the courts with more pre-trial mo-
tions.53
First, is it really a ‘‘radical change’’ to require a brief
factual statement in support of an affirmative defense
where the defendant, consistent with Rule 11, should
have those facts? Second, the assumption that a plain-
tiff can just ignore affirmative defenses is unwarranted.
The careful plaintiff will spend the time to discover the
basis, if any, for affirmative defenses.54 To ignore them
in discovery risks a surprise and a disaster at trial.
Moreover, the careful plaintiff’s counsel will either in-
sist that the affirmative defense be formally abandoned
or will bring motions to strike or for partial summary
judgment, thus undercutting the increased motion-
practice argument.55 Moreover, once lawyers under-
stand that affirmative defenses require a stated factual
basis, we can reasonably expect fewer affirmative de-
fenses to be asserted.56 There will be no need to waste
discovery time on those defenses without a factual ba-
sis and no need to burden the court with motions for
partial summary judgment as to those defenses having
no factual basis. Will there be more motions by defen-
dants to amend? Perhaps, but in most cases the right to
amend will be clear and the parties can be expected to
stipulate. Where there is a legitimate question as to the
sufficiency of the evidence to support an affirmative de-
fense, it is the proper role of the court and not an ‘‘un-
due’’ burden to hear that motion and decide the issue.
IV. Conclusion
The requirement of a factual basis for affirmative de-
fenses means relatively modest changes. The plausibil-
ity standard has no effect on pleading denials. The fac-
tual basis for a denial is stated in the complaint. For af-
firmative defenses, consistent with Twombly,
evidentiary pleading is not necessary. A brief factual
statement sufficient to make the legal defense plausible
is required.
Ultimately, this argument comes to a relatively
simple proposition: there is no reasonable basis for es-
tablishing different standards for plaintiffs and defen-
dants.57
47 Some courts and commentators have argued that the
need for notice provides a basis to require plausible facts for
affirmative defenses. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Hilco Receivables
LLC, 725 F. Supp. 2d 532, 536 (D. Md. 2010). See also Domin-
quez, et al., supra note 6 at 83. Since identification of the affir-
mative defense provides notice, the additional rationale of en-
suring adequate factual support for pleadings is necessary to
make the point.
48 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557-558 (2007).
49 See Palmer, No. 5:10cv00029, slip op. at 5 (noting that
‘‘litigation efficiency’’ weighs in favor of the conclusion that
‘‘the same heightened pleading standard should also apply to
affirmative defenses’’).
50 See, e.g., Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. O’Hara
Corp., No. 08-CV-10545, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48399, at *2
(E.D. Mich. June 25, 2008) (‘‘Boilerplate defenses clutter the
docket and, further, create unnecessary work.’’).
51 Wells Fargo & Co.,2010 WL 4530158, at *2.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Palmer, slip op. at 8.
55 Id. at 5.
56 See Barnes, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1172; Bradshaw, 725
F. Supp. 2d at 536.
57 See Francisco, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 77083, at *24-26.
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